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BUTT OUT!!
WHY THE FDA LACKS JURISDICTION
TO CURB SMOKING OF ADOLESCENTS
AND CHILDREN
INTRODUcTION
On August 28, 1996, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")1 is-
sued a final rule governing the sale and distribution of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products to persons under eighteen years of age.2 The
1. 21 U.S.C. § 393(a) (1994) ("There is established in the Department of Health and
Human Services the Food and Drug Administration.").
2. Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless To-
bacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (1996)(to be codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, and 897) (Aug. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Final Rule].
The Final Rule was first announced as a proposed rule in 1995 entitled, Regulations
Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco Products to
Protect Children and Adolescents, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,314 (1995) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt. 801, 803, 804, 897) (proposed Aug. 11, 1995) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]. The pro-
posed rule was released for comment until November 9, 1995. Id. at 41,314. Due to public
interest in this issue, the comment period was extended to January 2, 1996. FDA Proposed
Rule on Tobacco Scrutinized as Comment Period Ends, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Jan. 3,
1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File. The FDA received over 2,000 pages of
comments and 45,000 pages of supporting documents from the tobacco industry alone. Id.
According to Steven C. Parrish, senior vice president for Phillip Morris, most of the com-
ments submitted by the tobacco industry indicate that the FDA restrictions will not reduce
smoking by minors. Id. See also, Betsy Wagner, Tobacco Fights Back, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 15, 1995, at 12 (when the comment period ended, the FDA had received
641,000 letters, an agency record. The letters came from smokers and the tobacco industry
who said the government should not be involved in this issue, and from scientists who
urged even stronger restrictions).
The purpose for both the Final Rule and the Proposed Rule are the same, "[a]s stated in
the 1995 Proposed Regulation, the objective of the final rule is to meet the goal of the
report 'Healthy People 2000,' by reducing roughly by half children's and adolescent's use
of tobacco products." Final Rule at 44,423.
Tobacco sales to minors are already regulated by every state and the District of Colum-
bia. Many jurisdictions regulate the locations of vending machines. In addition, the ciga-
rette industry is already impacted by: (1) Department of Agriculture regulations for
production quotas and price levels; (2) a ban on television, radio, and other electronic
media that has been in place for 25 years; (3) warning label requirements on cigarette
packages; (4) the Federal Trade Commission rule on compliance with health hazard warn-
ings; (5) the monitoring of "ingredients used in cigarettes and smokeless tobacco products
... by the Department of Health and Human Services:" (6) federal, state, and local govern-
ment taxes on tobacco products which amount to $13 billion a year; and, (7) state and local
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FDA developed the rule, entitled, Regulations Restricting the Sale and
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco To Protect Children
and Adolescents3 ("new FDA rule"), to meet the goals of "Healthy Peo-
ple 2000 " 1 - a U.S. Public Health Service study outlining national health
targets for the year 2000. 5
"Healthy People 2000" sets forth 300 national health care objectives to
be accomplished by the year 2000. Tobacco is the third priority item
under health promotion.6 The new FDA rule is specifically intended to
laws and regulations governing where smoking is permitted. Tobacco Is Already Highly
Regulated, The Tobacco Institute (Jan. 10, 1994) (unpublished fact sheet) (on file with
author).
Regulation via an administrative agency can be seen as a way to address failure in the "
civil law. James T. O'Reilly, A Consistent Ethic of Safety Regulation: The Case for Improv-
ing Regulation of Tobacco Products, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 215, 224 (1989). When the public can
be protected by legal means such as tort law, regulation may not be needed. Id. Civil law
has not been able to protect consumers in the context of tobacco issues. Id. The cost of
tort litigation against the tobacco industry is high, and recovery is rare. Id.
See also, Ann Mileur Boeckman, An Exercise in Administrative Creativity: The FDA's
Assertion of Jurisdiction Over Tobacco Products, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 991, 1040
(1996)(concluding that the FDA did not have jurisdiction to promulgate the Proposed
Rule).
3. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 44,423. The term "adolescents and children" is used
throughout the final rule, but is not separately defined in the Definitions Section, section
897.3 of the rule. Id at 44,616. However, Section 897.14(a) states, "[n]o retailer may sell
cigarettes or smokeless tobacco to any person younger than 18 years of age." Id. The age
limit of 18 was selected by the FDA for a number of reasons:
First, as stated in the preamble to the 1995 Proposed Rule, all States prohibit the
sale of tobacco products to persons under the age of 18; currently only four States
prohibit cigarette sales to persons over 18 .... Second, selecting 18 as the mini-
mum age is consistent with the age Congress established under section 1926 of the
PHS Act, which conditions a State's receipt of substance abuse grants on State
laws to prohibit any manufacturer, retailer, or distributor of tobacco products
from selling or distributing such products to any individual under the age of 18.
Id. at 44,441.
"Cigarette" is generally defined in section 897.3(a) as "any product which contains nico-
tine, is intended to be burned under ordinary conditions of use." Id. at 44,616. "Smokeless
tobacco products" are defined in Section 897.3(i) as "any product that consists of cut,
ground, powdered, or leaf tobacco that contains nicotine and this is intended to be placed
in the oral cavity." Id.
4. James D. Mason & J. Michael McGinnis, "Healthy People 2000": An Overview of
the National Health Promotion and Disease Prevention Objectives, 105 PUB. HEALTH REP.
441, 441-42, 444 (1990).
5. J. Michael McGinnis & Philip R. Lee, "Healthy People 2000" at Mid Decade, 273
JAMA 1123 (1995).
6. Id. at 1124. The three broad goals of health for the nation are: "(1) [t]o increase
the span of healthy life for Americans; (2) [t]o reduce health disparities among Americans;
and (3) [t]o achieve access to preventative services for all Americans." Id. at 1123.
"Healthy People 2000" was based on previous national health targets for 1990 and was a
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reduce by half the number of children who use tobacco by the year 2000
through addressing the potential health risks related to cigarette and
smokeless tobacco product usage.7 Although the new FDA rule was is-
sued in 1996, most provisions are not effective until August 28, 19 97 .'
The new FDA rule is broad-based and will cover any entity9 that is
involved in the sale, distribution, or advertising of nicotine-containing cig-
arettes and smokeless tobacco products to persons under eighteen years
of age.10 The new FDA rule imposes restrictions on cigarettes in two
primary areas: (1) cigarette sales, and (2) labeling and advertising." The
sales restrictions require that each retailer verify that cigarette purchasers
are at least eighteen years old and that retailers, manufacturers, and dis-
tributors: distribute only packages containing at least twenty cigarettes;
discontinue use of vending machines in places where those under eight-
een are permitted; and eliminate free samples and mail orders.' 2 The
result of public hearings and a national consortium of health officials from the 50 states and
300 professional and voluntary national membership organizations. Id. "Healthy People
2000" was issued in September 1990. Id.
7. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 44,423. See also, RUTH BRECHER ET AL., THE CON-
SUMERS UNION REPORT ON SMOKING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 80 (1963)(studies have
shown that cigarette smokers are more likely than non-smokers to die from lung and other
cancers, cardiovascular disease, and various other conditions. In the Hammond-Horn
study, the death toll for cigarette smokers was 7,316 compared with only 4,651 that would
have been expected if smokers had the same death rate as non-smokers. Thus, among
cigarette smokers there were 2,665 more deaths than should have occurred).
8. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 44,396.
9. "Entity" here refers to manufacturers, distributors, and retailers. The final rule
makes "[e]ach manufacturer, distributor, and retailer ... responsible for ensuring that the
cigarettes or smokeless tobacco it manufactures, labels, advertises, packages, distributes,
sells, or otherwise holds for sale comply with all applicable requirements under [21 C.F.R.
section 897.10]." Id. at 44,616.
10. Id. The proposed rule does not apply to pipe tobacco or cigars because the FDA
does not have evidence that persons under 18 use them. Id. at 44,422-23.
11. Id. at 44,615-16. Specifically, the final rule concerning sales: (1) establishes,18 as
the federal minimum age for the purchase of cigarettes, Id. at 44,616, section 897.14(A); (2)
prohibits cigarette vending machines except in places where the retailer ensures, that no
person under 18 is present, free samples, mail-order sales, and self-service displays, Id. at
44,616-17, sections 897.16(c), 897.14(e); and (3) requires retailers to verify the ageof pur-
chasers, Id. at 44,616 section 897.14(b)(1). In terms of labeling and advertising, the rule:
(1) required each cigarette or smokeless tobacco package to say, "Nicotine-Delivery De-
vice for Persons 18 or Older," Id. at 44,617, section 897.25; (2) establishes the scope, for-
mat, and content requirements for advertising, Id. sections 897.30 - 897.32; (3) does not
allow any gift or item to be given to a person purchasing cigarettes, Id. at 44,617-18 section
897.34; and (4) eliminates sponsorship of athletic, musical, artistic, or social event using the
tobacco product brand name. Id.
12. Id. at 44,616-17, sections 897.14 and 897.16. Cigarettes can only be sold in face-to-
face exchanges between the retailer and consumer. The rule also restricts the name of
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restrictions on labeling and advertising are even more far-reaching, re-
quiring that: (1) no outdoor advertising be placed within 1,000 feet of a
playground or school;' 3 (2) text advertising be limited to black text with a
white background;' 4 (3) manufacturers not market, license, distribute, or
give as a gift any item that bears a name or logo identified with tobacco
use;' 5 and (4) manufacturers refrain from sponsoring any sporting or cul-
tural event using the logo or brand name of a tobacco product.
16
The new FDA rule was promulgated under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act ("FDCA"). 17 The FDCA allows the FDA to regulate items
that fall within the jurisdiction of the Act by regulating their sale, distri-
bution, and use.' 8 Failure to comply with regulations renders the product
misbranded under the FDCA, which can result in civil penalties or im-
prisonment for not more than one year or a $1,000 fine, or both. 9 Gen-
erally, the FDCA prohibits the introduction, delivery, misbranding, and
manufacture of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic in interstate com-
merce.2" No section of the FDCA specifically mentions cigarettes or
cigarettes to the trade names in effect as of January 1, 1995 - thus, new product names
introduced after this date cannot use catchy or chic names of non-tobacco products,
thereby restricting product names to those in force prior to January 1, 1995. Id.
13. Id. at 44,617. Section 897.30(b) requires that "[n]o outdoor advertising may be
placed within 1,000 feet of the parameter of any public playground in a public area...
elementary school, or secondary school." Id.
14. Id. Section 897.32(a) states that the black text and white background does not
apply to advertising appearing in adult publications. An adult publication is one in which
85% of the readers are age 18 or older, and has fewer than two million readers under the
age of 18. Id.
15. Id. Section 897.34(a) covers any item that has any indication of product identifica-
tion with cigarettes or is similar to those used for tobacco products. Id.
16. Id. at 44,618. Section 897.34(c) will allow the use of a corporate name to sponsor a
sporting or cultural event provided that both the corporation and the registered corporate
name were in existence prior to January 1, 1995. Id.
17. 21 U.S.C. § 301-93 (1994). "The Secretary, through the Commissioner, shall be
responsible for executing this chapter." Id. § 393(b)(2).
18. Id. § 360j(e).
19. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 44,616 section 897.1(b); 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1994). "Any
person who violates a provision of section 331 of this title shall be imprisoned for not more
than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or both." Id. § 331(a)(1). If there is another
violation after the first conviction, or there is intent to defraud or mislead, then the violator
could face imprisonment of up to three years, or a fine of $10,000, or both. 21 U.S.C.
§ 331(a)(2). See also, Gary E. Gamerman, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distinguish-
ing Nonmedical "Devices" from Medical "Devices" Under 21 US.C. 321(h), 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 806, 810 (1993) (if an article is deemed a device, it is subject to comprehen-
sive regulation by the FDA. Failure to comply can result in severe criminal and civil
punishments).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 331. The power to regulate interstate commerce stems from the
United States Constitution: "The Congressshall have [plower ... [t]o regulate Commerce
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their regulation.2' The FDA has determined, however, that cigarettes fall
within the FDCA jurisdiction as a "device."22
The new FDA rule is controversial. Tobacco manufacturers are chal-
lenging it in federal court on a number of bases, including the FDA's
jurisdiction over cigarettes.
23
This Comment critically examines whether the FDA's enabling legisla-
tion,24 the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,25 provides the FDA
with jurisdiction to promulgate regulations pertaining to cigarettes. This
Comment explores the FDA's contention that although cigarettes are not
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
21. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93.
22. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 44,396. "Device" is defined as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro rea-
gent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or acces-
sory, which is -
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals,
or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through
chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not
dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its principle in-
tended purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
23. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Coyne Beahon Inc. v.
United States Food and Drug Admin., United States District Court For The Middle Dis-
trict Of North Carolina Greensboro Division [hereinafter Complaint] (alleging the regula-
tions are unlawful because they are: (1) contrary to legislative intent; (2) precluded by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1331; (3) violations of the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93; and (4) violations of the free
speech and due process clauses in the United States Constitution amend. I and V). See
U.S. Asks Federal Court to Dismiss Lawsuit Filed by Tobacco Companies, CHARLESTON
GAZETrE, October 7, 1995, at A7. See also WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW, § 17 (1992) (explaining that the federal Administrative Procedures
Act permits a court to determine whether an agency is functioning within its jurisdiction,
and that the authority of the courts to make this determination was also established by the
Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932)); Tobacco Growers Help Collect
Over One Million Signatures Opposing FDA Regulation of Tobacco, The Tobacco Institute,
Jan. 10, 1995 (unpublished news release) (on file with author) (pointing out that tobacco
farmers in all 23 tobacco growing states are also challenging FDA regulations through a
petition drive to try to stop the FDA regulations).
24. An enabling statute is any statute "which confers new powers" to do something.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990).
25. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93 (1994).
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specifically mentioned in the FDCA, the FDA has jurisdiction over them
as a "device." Part I identifies the controversy surrounding the new FDA
rule. Part II discusses the process of rulemaking by the FDA. Part III
reviews the legislative history and evolution of the "device" definition.
Part IV analyzes the courts' definition of a "device" test under the
FDCA. Part V analyzes cigarettes in light of this test. Finally, this Com-
ment concludes that the current test for a "device," although broadened
in recent years, still turns on the manufacturer's intent and is not satisfied
for cigarette products.
I. THE CONTROVERSY
Today, approximately fifty million Americans smoke cigarettes.26 Cig-
arette smoking kills "more Americans each year than ... AIDS, alcohol,
car accidents, murders, suicides, illegal drugs, and fires combined."'27
Three million adolescents and children smoke, and it is estimated that
every day an additional three thousand become regular smokers. 28 Stud-
ies also suggest that of adult smokers, 82% had their first cigarette
before the age of eighteen.29 Indeed, those who did not smoke prior to
age eighteen are unlikely to begin smoking.3" One study found that from
the period of 1984 to 1989, smoking increased 5.5% among adolescents
(aged fourteen to seventeen), while smoking actually steadily decreased
for adults.3
Also, studies of adolescents' attitudes towards smoking show many are
unaware of its harmful effects. For example, in a 1993 study of persons
between ten and twenty-two years old,32 only 61% of high school sopho-
26. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,314.
27. Id. The United States Surgeon General has issued annual reports summarizing
medical data that show that tobacco use causes cancer, heart disease, respiratory problems,
and death. In addition, there are more than 300,000 tobacco-related deaths each year.
O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 217-18.
28. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,314.
29. Id. The United States Surgeon General began studying the consequences of to-
bacco in the early 1960s. Since that time, there have been thousands of studies, both na-
tional and'international, which confirm that smoking is a serious health hazard. Micheal S.
Burkhard & M. Allison Despard, Cigarette Classification a Burning Issue, 6 Loy. CON-
SUMER L. REP. 116, 116 (1994).
30. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,314.
31. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, Trends In Smoking Initiation Among
Adolescents And Young Adults - United States, 1980-1989, 274 JAMA 513, 528 (1995). The
study was conducted using data from the Tobacco Use Supplement of the 1992 and the
1993 Current Population Surveys which are monthly surveys sent to 56,000 households. Id.
32. Department of Health and Human Serv., Health-care Provider Advice on Tobacco
Use to Persons Aged 10-22 years - United States, 1993, 44 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY
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mores believed that the risk of smoking was great and only 44% believed
that the risk of using smokeless tobacco products was significant.
33
Although it is recognized that smoking by children and adolescents is a
national concern and it would be politically unpopular to suggest that the
young should smoke, the politics and money behind those for and those
opposed to the new FDA rule are tremendous. The stakes in the regula-
tion of tobacco are high. Tobacco is a forty-seven billion dollar a year
industry with strong lobbying power in Congress. 34 Tobacco is the sev-
enth largest cash crop in the United States and employs 48,800 people in
manufacturing alone.35
The tobacco industry does not argue that children should smoke. In
fact one cigarette manufacturer, Phillip Morris USA, began a twenty mil-
lion dollar "Action Against Access" initiative to discourage juvenile
smoking.36 The initiative places notices on all cigarette packs and cartons
stating, "Underage Sale Prohibited," discontinues free cigarette samples
to consumers, and denies retail incentives to stores fined or convicted of
selling cigarettes to minors.37 The tobacco industry, however, asserts that
the FDA is attempting a power grab by regulating the distribution of ciga-
rettes to adolescents and children and that the real "hidden" agenda is to
restrict all smoking.3 s Some industry insider groups have intimated that
REP. 825, 826 (1995). The general finding of the study was that the "low levels of under-
standing [among adolescents] about the harmfulness of tobacco products underscores the
need ... to counter the allure of tobacco." Id.
33. Id.
34. Clinton Takes On The Tobacco Industry, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 21,
1995, at 8.
35. Burkhard & Despard, supra note 29, at 117. See generally Brecher et al., supra
note 7, at 122-23 (The practice of non-tobacco smoking goes back to the time of the ancient
Greeks, but was considered for medicinal purposes rather than pleasure. Tobacco was
native only to the Americas and the first users, were the American Indians who smoked it
through a Y-shaped pipe. Once Christopher Columbus discovered America, he and other
explorers purchased tobacco seeds and brought the plant back to Europe.).
36. Supra note 34, at 8. But see Doug Levy, Smoke Screen Alleged, Teen "jigarette
Sales Unpunished, USA TODAY, Oct. 25, 1995, at D1. (Minnesota's Attorney xGeneral
Hubert Humphery III, said that Phillip Morris has no serious plans to implement its "Ac-
tion Against Access" initiative. Phillip Morris has failed to act against 17 Minnesotp stores
caught for selling to minors. Phillip Morris vice president Ellen Merlo countered that the
company will take action once they establish a streamlined method of receiving reports of
violations from each state and then will take action against merchants when they renegoti-
ate contracts.).
37. Andrew Kaplan, Reaction Mixed on PM Campaign: Wholesalers' Reaction to Phil-
lip Morris Inc.'s Advertising Campaign Against Cigarette Sales to Minors, U.S. DISTRIBU-
TION J., Aug. 15, 1995, at 5.
38. Marlene Cimons, Cigarette Regulation Plan Challenged; Tobacco: Five Major
Companies Along with Pro-Smoker, Advertising and Trade Groups Claim FDA has No
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the Commissioner of the FDA, Dr. David A. Kessler, is out to get the
tobacco industry because he has an addiction to media attention, undis-
guised opportunism, and a desire for a more powerful FDA.39
Industry representatives claim that the FDA is engaged in "jurispru-
dential gymnastics" by trying to regulate cigarettes as devices,n° and the
industry is challenging this action in federal court on a number of bases
including the FDA's jurisdiction over cigarettes. 41 Yet, to cover all their
bases of support, the tobacco industry contributes heavily to Congres-
sional campaigns. Since 1985, the industry has contributed more than
seventeen million dollars in political action committee money and "soft
money" to congressional candidates and national parties.42 In the first six
months of 1995, the tobacco industry gave a record 1.5 million dollars to
national parties.43 The industry has taken this approach to ensure that
Jurisdiction Over Product, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1996, at All (citing the statement of the
Tobacco Institute and Steven C. Parrish, senior vice president for corporate affairs for Phil-
lip Morris).
39. Peter Samuel, The Kessler Kastle: Smoke and Mirrors, NAT'L REv., Oct. 9, 1995, at
48 (stating that insiders have dubbed a proposed new FDA complex in Clarksburg, Mary-
land "Kessler Kastle" to intimate their disapproval with Dr. Kessler's need for power). See
also Tobacco Growers Help Collect Over One Million Signatures Opposing FDA Regula-
tion of Tobacco, The Tobacco Institute, (Jan. 10, 1995) (unpublished news release) (on file
with author) (quoting F. H. "Buzz" Shackelford, Jr., a North Carolina tobacco grower as
saying, "FDA Commissioner Dr. David Kessler's attempt to gain power over cigarettes
suggests that he is more interested in a political and personal agenda than in the mission
which Congress has defined for the FDA").
40. FDA Proposed Rule on Tobacco Scrutinized as Comment Period Ends, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY, Jan. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File (citing
comment by Steven C. Parrish, senior vice president of Phillip Morris).
41. See Complaint, supra note 23, at 1.
42. The Senate Campaign Spending Limits and Election Reform Act of 1995: Hearings
on S. 1219 Before the Senate Rules Committee, 104 Cong., 2nd Sess. (1996) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Ann McBride, President, Common Cause). "Soft money" is
money given to nonfederal accounts where the amount of the contribution is unlimited.
Penny Loeb et al., The Greening of America. Candidates Will Spend More Money Than
Ever to Buy Votes, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 12, 1996, at 34, 35. For example,
individuals can only give up to $1,000 to a presidential campaign and $20,000 to a national
party, but can give an unlimited amount to a nonfederal account for party building and
voter registration drives. Id. Tobacco companies "Phillip Morris... and Brown & Wil-
liamson were among the top soft-money givers to the Republicans in the first half of 1995."
Id. This soft-money is important because it buys access to decision makers. Id. "Political
Action Committees" ("PACs") are formed by those with particular industry interests.
Michael Lind, Me and Mrs. Smith: Will the GOP betray political reform?, NEW REPUBLIC,
Feb. 5, 1996, at 16. The first large and influential PAC was organized by the AFL-CIO, and
was interested in labor issues, but PACs have expanded to include those with corporate
interests and certain ideologies. Id. There are now more than 4,000 PACs compared with
only 600 in 1974. Id.
43. Hearings, supra note 42.
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when the new FDA rule becomes effective, Congress will not fund the
program, effectively killing the rule.' Already, thirty-two senators, in-
cluding those from tobacco growing states, have sent letters to the agency
opposing the new FDA rule.45
On the other side of the issue, anti-smoking activists praise the new
FDA rule.4 6 These activists state that the new FDA rule is not a first step
in a total ban of tobacco, and that the industry is merely using this argu-
ment to cause opposition to the new FDA rule.47 In fact, twenty-eight
attorneys general, who were looking for a plan to combat the six billion
44. Levy, supra note 36, at Dl. See also Stephen Barr, Cuts Frustrate OSHA Plans to
Improve Worker Safety, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 1996, at Al.
It didn't take long for the budget-cutting efforts of House Republicans to be felt
at OSHA's [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] offices a few blocks
away from the Capitol. The cuts they have made at the agency are part of a
concerted effort to scale back Washington's regulatory reach. And they illustrate
the kind of de facto deregulation that is changing how many rule-making agencies
do their jobs, even as broader regulatory reform legislation remains stalled in
Congress .... For years, congressional Republicans have made no secret of their
dislike for OSHA, portraying it as a nit-picking bureaucracy that inconsistently
applies the law or, worse, as a regulatory bully.
Id. See also Cindy Skrzycki, Slowing the Flow Of Federal Rules New Conservative Climate
Chills Agencies' Activism, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1996, at Al.
Under pressure from congressional Republicans, budget cuts and the Clinton ad-
ministration's efforts to cut red tape, the federal agencies charged with protecting
Americans from unhealthy workplaces, pollution and unsafe products have begun
to fundamentally change the way they do their job. Bureaucrats who for a gener-
ation dictated enormous volumes of rules are more readily compromising with
the industries they regulate. Others are finding that they don't have enough
money to enforce rules or conduct inspections. Still others find themselves or-
dered practically overnight to reverse longstanding policy. The result is a de facto
deregulation of American business that marks a significant departure from de-
cades of government policy.
Id.
45. FDA Proposed Rule on Tobacco Scrutinized As Comment Period Ends, BNA
HEALTH CARE DAILY, Jan. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNA File. The two
Senators who signed the letter that are from tobacco growing states are Jesse Helms, Re-
publican from North Carolina, and Wendell Ford, Democrat from Kentucky. See also
O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 221-3.
The decision by Congress to micro-manage the issue of tobacco products is ex-
tremely inconsistent with its delegation of power. This decision cannot be ex-
plained in terms other than the financial or electoral rewards for individuals in
Congress to protect the particular industry involved. . . . [T]he system which
strives to prevent consumer cancer but ignores tobacco has no consistent ration-
ale with which to explain its glaring omission.
Id. at 222.
46. Levy, supra note 36, at Dl.
47. Id. (discussing the remarks of Scott Ballin, Chairman of the Coalition on Smoking
or Health).
1996]
178 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 13:169
dollar annual advertising and promotional campaigns of the tobacco in-
dustry, requested that the FDA propose regulation of tobacco with re-
gard to adolescents and children.48
In announcing the new FDA rule, President Clinton49 said that he does
not want to ban smoking for adults. According to the President, informa-
tion showing that 3,000 young people begin to smoke cigarettes every day
was a compelling reason to regulate the industry because young people
are more vulnerable and susceptible to the temptation to smoke. 50 How-
ever, President Clinton also stated that he prefers a more permanent, leg-
islated solution to this issue, rather than a regulatory one via the FDA.5'
Thus, the true issue regarding the propriety of the new FDA rule is not
whether teens should smoke. After all, both sides of the controversy
agree that smoking at a young age is harmful; rather, the issue is whether
current law permits the regulation of cigarettes. To uncover the current
law, this Comment looks at FDA rulemaking procedures, the legislative
history of the FDCA pertaining to devices, and case law interpretation of
the FDCA.
II. AGENCY PROPOSED RULEMAKING PROCESS
FDA rulemaking is governed by the FDCA, the Administrative Proce-
dures Act ("APA"),52 and agency regulations.53 The APA and agency
regulations are procedural in nature, but the FDCA is substantive.54 The
FDCA gives the FDA authority to promulgate regulations for the effi-
cient enforcement of the statute, 55 thereby allowing rulemaking, provided
48. Id. See also John Schwartz, Group Targets Tobacco Use Among Youth Associa-
tion-Backed Center Shares Cause With FDA, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1996, at A17 (a new 30
million dollar National Center for Tobacco-Free Kids was created by anti-smoking activists
to find ways to keep children from smoking. The group plans to spend money to create
and place advertisements intended to promote the control of tobacco products, draw-to-
gether disparate anti-smoking groups, and combat the six billion dollars the tobacco indus-
try spends each year to market tobacco products.).
49. Protecting Young People From "the Awful Dangers of Tobacco," WASH. POST,
Aug. 11, 1995, at A14.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-558 (1994).
53. 21 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1404.635 (1995).
54. "As a general rule, laws which fix duties, establish rights and responsibilities
among and for persons, natural or otherwise, are 'substantive laws' in character, while
those which merely prescribe the manner in which such rights and responsibilities may be
exercised and enforced in a court are 'procedural laws."' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1203
(6th ed. 1990).
55. 21 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1994).
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the agency follows the APA and agency regulations. The APA gives basic
requirements for all agencies to follow in promulgating regulations.5 6
The APA criteria for rulemaking are less specific than the agency regula-
tions, but generally require publication of proposed rules in the Federal
Register and a period for the submission of written comments or views by
any interested party.
57
According to agency regulations, the FDA "Commissioner may pro-
pose and promulgate regulations for the efficient enforcement of the laws
administered by FDA whenever it is necessary or appropriate to do so."58
Agency regulations require the publication of any proposed rules in the
Federal Register and allow public comment for sixty days 9.5  The Com-
missioner may shorten this period to no less than ten days or extend the
comment time for good cause.60 An extension is made when any inter-
ested party submits a written request to the FDA Commissioner stating
the grounds for the extension.6' The Commissioner may then grant or
deny the extension of time.62 Any extension of thirty days or more will
be published in the Federal Register. 63 Once the comment period ends,
the Commissioner reviews the entire administrative record for the rule,
including all comments, and then will either "terminate proceedings, issue
a new proposed rule, or promulgate a final regulation." 6
The proposed FDA rule pertaining to restriction of cigarette sales to
children and adolescents was published in the Federal Register on August
11, 1995.65 The initial Federal Register notice stated that the period for
written public comments and recommendations was open until Novem-
ber 9, 1995.66 Numerous tobacco companies and the Food Marketing In-
stitute, however, requested that the FDA extend the comment period on
the grounds that some of the data referenced in the proposed FDA rule
56. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
57. Id. § 553(b)-(c).
58. 21 C.F.R. § 10.40(a) (1995).
59. Id. § 10.40(b). A notice of proposed rulemaking published in the Federal Register
must contain certain information, such as the nature of the action, a summary of the sub-
stance of the rule, and the name and number of an agency contact. Id. § 10.40(b)(1)(ii),
(iii), (v).
60. Id. § 10.40(2).
61. Id. § 10.40(b)(3).
62. Id. § 10.40(b)(3)(i).
63. Id. § 10.40(b)(3)(ii).
64. Id. § 10.40(b)(5)(c).
65. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,314.
66. Id.
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was not available for review.67 In addition, the regulatory issues were
complex and controversial, therefore more time was needed to prepare
comments.68 In response, the FDA extended the comment period to Jan-
uary 2, 1996.69 On August 28, 1996, the FDA issued the new FDA rule,
however, most provisions are not effective until August 28, 1997.70
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE "DEVICE" DEFINITION
The FDA promulgated its new rule under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act ("FDCA").7' The FDCA allows the FDA to regulate items
that fall within the jurisdiction of the Act by regulating the sale, distribu-
tion, and use of the item.72 Failure to comply with regulations can result
in civil and criminal penalties. 73 Generally, the FDCA prohibits the in-
troduction, delivery, misbranding, and adulteration of any food, drug, de-
vice, or cosmetic in interstate commerce.74 No provision of the FDCA
specifically mentions cigarettes or their regulation. 75 The FDA has deter-
mined, however, that cigarettes fall within the FDCA jurisdiction as a
"device" 76 intended to affect the structure or function of the body. Thus,
67. Id. at 53,560.
68. Id
69. Id.
70. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 44,396.
71. 21 U.S.C. § 301-393 (1994). "The Secretary, through the Commissioner, shall be
responsible for executing this chapter." Id.
72. Id. § 360j(e).
73. Id. § 333. See also Gamerman, supra note 19, at 810 (If an article is a device, it is
subject to comprehensive FDA regulation. Failure to comply with regulations can result in
civil and criminal penalties.).
74. 21 U.S.C. § 331. Power to regulate interstate commerce stems from the United
States Constitution. "The Congress shall have [p]ower ... [t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
75. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93.
76. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 44,396. "Device" is defined as:
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro rea-
gent, or other similar or related article, including any component, part, or acces-
sory which is -
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals, and which does not achieve any of its principle intended purposes
through chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which
is not dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its princi-
ple intended purposes.
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because cigarettes are not specifically mentioned in the language of the
FDCA, a deciding court would have to look to legislative history to deter-
mine whether Congress intended to include cigarettes within the "device"
definition of the FDCA.7 7
The current definition of a device under section 20178 of the FDCA
developed through an evolutionary process of amendments, primarily in
1938, 1976, and 1990, in response to prevailing societal problems.79
Although the term "drug" was defined in the Federal Food and Drug Act
of June 30, 1906, there was no separate definition of "device."80 Congress
was dissatisfied with the weakness of the 1906 Act, however, particularly
the requirement for "knowing fraud" as a precondition of regulation.8'
Congressional sponsors of new legislation wanted greater control over
drugs that were injurious to health.82 Specifically, Congress wanted to
address national problems such as the elixir sulfanilamide tragedy.
8 3
More than one hundred people around the country were killed in that
incident when a chemist for a well-known drug company developed and
sold an elixir that was actually a deadly poison when ingested in recom-
mended amounts.'
In 1938, Congress passed the FDCA which included a new definition of
"device" that paralleled that of "drugs:"
85
The term "device" . . . means instruments, apparatus, and con-
trivances, including their components, parts, and accessories, in-
tended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment,
or prevention of disease in man or other animals; or (2) to affect
the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals.86
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
77. See Gamerman, supra note 19, at 815. "The proper test of FDA's interpretation of
its organic statute is whether its interpretation coincides with legislative intent; if that in-
tent is ambiguous, then the issue is whether its interpretation is rational and consistent."
Id.
78. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
79. Amendment of "device" in 1976 per the Medical Device Amendments of 1976,
Pub. L. 94-295 § 3(d), 90 Stat. 539, 575 (1976) (amended by the Safe Medical Devices Act
of 1990, Pub. L. 101-629 § 16(b), 104 Stat. 4511, 4526 (1990)).
80. Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, 768-69 (1906).
81. S. REP. No. 74-361, at 1-2 (1935); 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FOOD, DRUG AND AD-
MINISTRATION § 13.02 (2d ed. Supp. 1995).
82. O'RELLY, supra note 81, at § 13.02.
83. Id.
84. 1d.
85. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040, 1041 (1938).
86. Id
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Congress included the definition for "device" in order to bring under the
purview of the FDCA quack products that manifested a fraud on soci-
ety.8 7 One product specifically mentioned in Congressional debate was a
machine that diagnosed the consumer's illness with a spinning indicator
that stopped randomly at appendicitis, meningitis, or some other ailment
listed on the wheel.
8 8
The original FDCA definition of "device" was in place for nearly forty
years,8 9 until Congress changed the definition to address defective medi-
cal products.9" The original "device" definition from the 1938 FDCA
simply did not protect the public from fraudulent or unsafe medical prod-
ucts which were in abundance at the time.91 Congress was specifically
concerned with The Dalkon Shield intrauterine contraceptive device
which caused miscarriages and killed many. women.9 2
On May 28, 1976, Congress passed the Medical Device Amendments of
197691 which added regulations pertaining to medical devices94 and also
amended the general definition of a "device" in section 201(h).95 The
new "device" definition from the 1976 Act retained the "intended use"
limitation96 in the FDCA, but added some new items to be considered
devices, such as implants, in vitro reagents and items recognized in the
official National Formulary or United States Pharmacopeia.97
87. See Gamerman, supra note 19, at 817 n.67.
88. United States v. An Article of Drug... Batco-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 795-96 (1969)
(quoting 79 CONG. REC. S4842 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1935) (statement of Sen. Copeland)).
89. From the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938), to the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(1976).
90. See Gamerman, supra note 19, at 820 n.89.
91. Id. at 820.
92. Id. at 857 n.89. Congress was also concerned with the number of deaths related to
pacemakers. Id.
93. Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified, in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
94. Id.
95. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994).
96. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539, 575 (1976).
See Gamerman, supra note 19, at 824.
97. 90 Stat. at 539, 575.
The term 'device' ... means an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, con-
trivance, implant, in vitro reagent, or other similar or related article including any
component, part, or accessory which is -
(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals, and which does not achieve any of its principal intended purposes
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In 1990, Congress again dealt with regulating medical devices 98 and
modified the general definition of "device" within section 201(h) of the
FDCA. 9 Congress passed the Safe Medical Devices Act of 19901° to
address the Bjork-Shiley scandal involving heart valve prostheses that
were improperly designed and manufactured, and could cause death.101
The Act changed the definition of the term "drug" by striking out the
portion which said a device could not be a drug and also changed the
"device" definition to clarify primary versus principal intended pur-
pose.'1 2 Thus, although Congress has changed the FDCA definition of
"device" to include more items under its jurisdiction, each revision re-
tained the "intended use" limitation in the definition.
10 3
In debate concerning the breadth of the FDCA, Congress repeatedly
has been made aware that the FDA cannot assert jurisdiction over ciga-
rettes absent health claims made by manufacturers.' °4 In fact, former
FDA Commissioners have testified to Congress that "[c]igarettes and
other tobacco products would be drugs subject to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act if medical claims are made for the product ...
[H]owever, cigarettes recommended for smoking pleasure are beyond the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act."'0 5
During debate over the FDCA and subsequent amendments, Congress
knew that the definitions of drugs and devices could be difficult to inter-
pret and at the same time, did not want the FDA to have authority that
was too broad. 10 6 Congress recognized that the FDA should restrain "it-
though chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which
is not dependant upon being metabolized for the achievement of any of its princi-
pal intended purposes.
Id.
At the time of the 1976 amendment, there were two drug formulary books that were
widely used by the medical community: the National Formulary, and the United States
Pharmacopeia. If an item was listed in either of these publications, the product was consid-
ered a drug. O'REiLU, supra note 81, at § 13.03.
98. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990).
99. Id. at'4526.
100. Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511 (1990).
101. See Gamerman, supra note 19, at 857 n.115.
102. Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511,4526 (1990).
("Section 201 (21 U.S.C. § 321) is amended - (1) in paragraph (g)(1), by striking out 'but
does not include devices or their components, parts, or accessories,' and (2) in paragraph
(h)(3), by striking out 'any of its principal' and inserting in lieu thereof 'its primary."').
103. Gamerman, supra note 19, at 823-24.
104. Action on Smoking and Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
105. Id. (quoting the statement of Dr. Charles C. Edwards, acting FDA Commissioner
in 1972).
106. See Gamerman, supra note 19, at 816. Representative Collins'stated that with too
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self and exercise no more authority than .. necessary to protect the
public."1"7 Congressman Rogers provided an explanation of Congress'
position when he said:
What we have done is write a bill specific enough so that we do
not turn over broad authority to the FDA and let them write
regulations any way they want to. We have been specific be-
cause we believe Congress should write the law specifically. The
committee does not intend to allow regulatory agencies to do
anything they want to.' °8
Further, in the early 1960's, when the United States Surgeon General
began investigating the health consequences of smoking, 109 Congress
passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act ("Labeling
Act")" rather than amend the FDCA. The Labeling Act required that
cigarette manufacturers place a warning label on each package of ciga-
rettes and banned cigarette advertising from television and radio."' Ad-
ditionally, as recently as 1994, legislation was proposed in the United
States House of Representatives to give the FDA regulatory authority
over the "manufacture, sale, labeling, advertising, and content of tobacco
products."'"12 The legislation was offered as an amendment to an Agricul-
ture Department spending bill, but ultimately was not passed because the
House Rules Committee prevented consideration of the amendment."1
3
Thus, Congress has purposely limited device jurisdiction for the FDCA
at the same time that it has recognized that cigarettes do not fall within
the current statutes. 1 4 This is well-established by the fact that the sepa-
much flexibility the FDA could regulate, "well nigh everything in creation." Id. at 816
n.59.
107. Id. at 822.
108. Id. There was fear that the FDA, like many other agencies, would extend jurisdic-
tion beyond that originally given by Congress. Id. at 821-22.
109. Burkhard & Despard, supra note 29, at 116.
110. Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (current version codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333
(1994)).
.111. See Burkhard & Despard, supra note 29, at 116 (citing to 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994)).
112. Move In Congress To Put Tobacco Under FDA Control, PANTAGRAPH, Jun. 14,
1994, at Al, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP file. Congressman Dick Durbin, Con-
gressman Mike Synar, and Congressman Ron Wyden offered the legislation as an amend-
ment to the agriculture spending bill. Id. The legislation "would prohibit the FDA from
banning tobacco ... [blut would give FDA authority to regulate the manufacture, sale,
labeling, advertising and content of tobacco products." Id.
113. Id.
114. Congress has delegated many health related tasks to administrative agencies in the
past. O'RELLY, supra note 2, at 221. Delegation occurs mainly because the agencies have
the technical expertise to resolve complicated health issues. However, the regulation of
tobacco is one area where Congress has not delegated power. Id. This inconsistency in
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rate Labeling Act was required for cigarettes and also by the introduction
of legislation designed to bring cigarettes within the FDCA.115 The sub-
sequent guides in determining whether cigarettes fall within the purview
of the FDCA are judicial decisions.
IV. DEFINITION OF THE "DEVICE" TEST
A. The Courts
The FDA has stated that jurisdiction over cigarettes is based upon the
definition of "device," specifically, upon the third prong of the definition
which states that the product is intended to affect the structure or func-
tion of the human body. 1 6 The courts focused on the meaning of the
term "intent." "Intent" describes a person's "desire[ ] to cause conse-
quences of his act, or [his belief] that the consequences are substantially
certain to result.""' 7 Intent is separate from motive which "is what
prompts a person to act.""18
One of the first cases involving cigarette regulation was actually
brought by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") rather than the
FDA.119 In Federal Trade Commission v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco
Co.,2' the FTC attempted to enjoin the dissemination of Chesterfield
cigarettes as a drug' 2' under the Federal Trade Commission Act.'22 The
company's advertising claimed that Chesterfield cigarettes "can be
smoked by any smoker without inducing any adverse affect upon the
nose, throat, and accessory organs of the smoker."' 23 The term "drug"
under the Federal Trade Commission Act had the same statutory defini-
delegation is explained by Congress' willingness to protect the tobacco industry for the
financial and electorial rewards it brings to Congress. Id.
115. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a)-(c) (1988).
116. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,521. The third prong of the definition in the
FDCA states that a device is,
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through chem-
ical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not depen-
dent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended
purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994).
117. BLACK'S LAW DIcrONARY 810 (6th ed. 1990).
118. Id
119. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp. 573
(S.D.N.Y. 1952), affd, 203 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1953).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 573.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
123. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp. at 573.
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tion as that of the FDCA.'24 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York examined whether cigarettes were in-
tended to affect the structure or function of the human body.125 The
court decided that legislative intent was the proper test for the case and
found that legislators did not mean the phrase "intend to affect" to be all-
inclusive.' 26 The court held that in construing its ,powers, an "agency
must not exceed the bounds of its statute."127 Further, the court said that
legislative history coupled with administrative interpretations lead to the
"conclusion that Congress, had the matter been considered, would not
have intended cigarettes to be included as an article 'intended to affect
the functions of the body of man' or in any other definition of 'drug.""
128
Also, there are two cases from the 1950's in which the government
sought to regulate cigarettes as drugs based on manufacturer's intent
under the FDCA.' 29 Although declining to apply the definition of "de-
vice" to cigarettes in these cases, the court holdings pertaining to intent
are relevant because the definitions for "drugs" and "devices" are essen-
tially parallel and the device definition was added for semantic rea-
sons.' 3 ' Thus, reviewing intent under the "drug" definition is the same as
that under "device" definition.
In the first case, United States v. 46 Cartons, More Or Less, Containing
124. See Burkhard & Despard, supra note 29, at 118.




129. United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons ... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp.
847 (D.N.J. 1959); United States v. 46 Cartons, More or Less, Containing Fairfax Ciga-
rettes, 113 F. Supp. 336, 336-37 (D.N.J. 1953).
130. United States v. An Article of Drug ... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 797 (1963).
In the 1950's when the cases concerning cigarettes as drugs were decided, the definition of
drug was:
(1) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, official Ho-
meopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United States, or official National Formulary, or
any supplement to any of them; and (2) articles intended for use in the diagnosis,
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; and
(3) articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body of man or other animals; and (4) articles intended for use as a component of
any article specified in clause (1), (2) or (3); but does not include devices or their
components, parts, or accessories.
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040, 1041 (1938) (empha-
sis added). The term device included: "instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, includ-
ing their components, parts, and accessories, intended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals; or (2) to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man or other animals." Id.
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Fairfax Cigarettes,'3' the company had a leaflet accompanying the ciga-
rettes that suggested that the cigarettes were effective in "preventing re-
spiratory diseases, common cold, influenza, pneumonia, acute sinusitis,
acute tonsillitis, scarlet fever, whooping cough, measles, meningitis, tu-
berculosis, mumps, otitis media (middle ear infection), [and] men-
ingopneumonitis psittacosis (parrot fever)."' 32 The United States District
Court 'of New Jersey considered the manufacturer's representations of
the product and pronounced that there is an indication that the item was
intended for the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease;
thus, the item is a drug within the meaning of the Act.'3 3 It is clear that
the manufacturer's representations of the product are determinant of in-
tent for the "drug" test under the FDCA.13 4 Thus, the district court held
that absent intent on the part of the manufacturer, the "drug" test is not
met.
35
The second case pertaining to FDA jurisdiction over cigarettes was also
in the United States District Court of New Jersey and took place six years
later.136 In United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons... Trim Reducing-Aid Cig-
arettes,137 the manufacturer claimed that the Trim Reducing-Aid ciga-
rettes were effective in the reduction of body weight of the users and
were safe for use by human beings.' 38 In reviewing whether a cigarette
was a drug, the district court again considered the intent of the manufac-
turer. It concluded that because tartic acid was added to the cigarette
and the "[c]laimant readily concede[d] that its product [was] intended to
affect the structure and functions of the human body by reducing the ap-
petite for the ingestion of food and thereby achieving a reduction in the
body's weight," the product was a drug.
1 39
Thus, in these two cases involving the regulation of cigarettes, the
courts established that the test for intending to affect the structure or
function of the human body was to look at the manufacturer's representa-
tion. Neither of these cases were challenged or appealed.
One of the few cases reaching the United States Supreme Court on the
131. 46 Cartons, More or Less.... 113 F. Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953).




136. United States v. 354 Bulk Cartons... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp.
847 (D.N.J. 1969).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 848-49.
139. Id. at 851.
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issue of the definition of drugs and devices under the FDCA, was United
States v. An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk."4 ° There the Court looked
at legislative history as a guide to its decision. 4' In Batco-Unidisk, an
antibiotic sensivity disc, which was used as a screening device in deter-
mining the proper antibiotic drug to administer to patients, was con-
demned on the assumption it was a drug, and therefore, subject to pre-
market approval.' 42 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan found that the disc was not a drug and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 43
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit
and held that the disc was a drug within the meaning of the FDCA.
44
Here, the Court first looked at the language of the statute to determine
whether the discs were drugs or devices. 45 The Court, however, found
that the statutory language was insufficiently precise, so it looked at statu-
tory purpose. 146 The Court concluded that, "legislative history, read in
light of the statute's remedial purpose, directs us to read the classification
'drug' broadly, and to confine the device exception as nearly as is possible
to the types of items Congress suggested in debates, such as electric belts,
[and] quack diagnostic scales.' 1 47 Thus, the Supreme Court limited the
definition of a device to items where there is either intent on the part of
the manufacturer or where Congress has expressly named the article.
Relying on this prior case law, a citizen petition was filed in 1977 with
the FDA requesting that the agency regulate cigarettes as a drug or de-
vice.' 48 The FDA denied the petition and suit was filed in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia in Action on Smoking
and Health v. Califano.1 49 The district court granted summary judgment
because it found the FDA was consistent in its position that cigarettes
140. 394 U.S. 784 (1969). The court held that antibiotic sensitivity disc is a drug per the
FDCA. Id. at 800.
141. Id. at 799.
142. Id. at 785.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 800-01. "[W]e are supported in the decision to uphold the FDA's determina-
tion that the sensitivity discs fall under the coverage of the Act and specifically undei the
drug provision." Id. at 800.
145. Id. at 789.
146. Id. at 799.
147. Id. at 799-800.
148. Action on Smoking And Health v. Harris, 655 F.2d 236, 237 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
149. Civ. No. 78-338 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 1976), cited in Harris, 655 F.2d at 237. This case
was filed on March 1, 1978 subsequent to Action on Smoking's request being denied by the
FDA. Harris, 655 F.2d at 237.
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were not a drug. The district court stated that the FDA Commissioner
rejected the plaintiff's request to have the FDA assert jurisdiction over
cigarettes because the FDA has had a "consistent position that cigarettes
will not be deemed a drug unless health claims are made by the ven-
dors."' 5 ° In denying the citizen petition, the FDA Commissioner pointed
out that jurisdiction over cigarettes could not be predicated upon evi-
dence of a serious health hazard.' 5 ' Rather, "the FDA has asserted juris-
diction over cigarettes only when health claims were made by the vendors
or manufacturers."' 52 Further, the Commissioner of the FDA stated that
"labeling or banning cigarettes is a step that can be take[n] only by the
Congress. Any such move by the FDA would be inconsistent with the
clear congressional intent."' 53
An appeal was filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Action on Smoking and Health v. Har-
ris."'54 The Court of Appeals agreed with the FDA and district court,
holding that the test used to determine what falls under the FDCA juris-
diction as a device is vendor's intent.' 55 The court went on to say that
vendor intent can be established "based upon subjective vendor claims or
objective evidence such as labeling, promotional materials, advertising,"
or other relevant sources. 56 The appeals court added a caveat to the test,
however, that when vendor intent is not shown subjectively or objec-
tively, consumer intent can be used if the evidence "is strong enough to
justify an inference as to vendors' intent."' 57 The burden of showing that
vendor intent is derived from consumer use is higher than showing intent
from vendor claims. To meet the higher standard, "consumers must use
the product predominantly-in fact nearly exclusively-with the appro-
priate intent before [vendor] intent can be inferred.' 58 However, the
150. Harris, 655 F.2d at 237.
151. Id. at 239.
152. Id. In the Commissioner's denial letter he cited the support for his health claim
using both United States v. 46 Cartons, More Or Less, Containing Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F.
Supp. 336 (D.N.J. 1953) and United States v. 354 Bulk Carons... Trim Reducing-Aid
Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847 (D.N.J. 1959). Harris, 655 F.2d at 239 n.7.
153. Harris, 655 F.2d at 241.
154. 655 F.2d 236 (1980).
155. Id. at 239.
156. Id. See also Hanson v. U.S., 417 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Minn.), affd, 540 F.2d 947 (8th
Cir. 1976) ("It is well established that the 'intended use' of a product, within the meaning
of the Act, is determined from its label, accompanying labeling, promotional claims, adver-
tising, and any other relevant source.").
157. Harris, 655 F.2d at 239.
158. Id. at 239-40.
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court ruled that the plaintiff "did not establish, and arguably cannot es-
tablish, the near-exclusivity of consumer use of cigarettes with the intent
'to affect the structure or any function of the body." ' 15 9 The Harris court
concluded that Congress, not the judiciary, has authority to broaden the
statute to incorporate cigarettes; 160 this holding was not challenged and
has not been overturned in subsequent cases.'
6'
Thus, from the early 1950's through 1980, federal district courts, courts
of appeal, and the Supreme Court have stated the "intended use" test
pertaining to cigarette regulation under the FDCA is determined by look-
ing at the vendor's intent. 62 In 1989, the United States District Court for
the Central District of Utah agreed that "whether a product is a device
turns solely on the product's intended use.' 1 6 3 In United States v. 22 Rec-
tangular or Cylindrical Finished Devices,'" the district court considered
the jurisdiction of the FDA over a sterilization device under the
159. Id. at 240.
160. Id. at 243.
161. See U.S. v. TWo Plastic Drums, More or Less... Black Currant Oil, 761 F. Supp. 70
(C.D. I11. 1991), affd, 984 F.2d 814 (7th Cir. 1993). Here the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois was confronted with the issue of whether two drums of
black currant oil were food additives pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act. Id. at 71. The court determined that the proper test for the definition of a food
additive was (1) whether the oil was intended to be used as a component of food, and (2)
whether the oil is regarded as safe within the meaning of the statute. Id. The court, using
the "intent test" from Action in Smoking v. Harris, said intent was determined by examin-
ing "a wide range of evidence, including the vendor's stated intent, actual use of the prod-
uct, consumer use of the product, product labeling, and product marketing." Id. at 72. The
court held that the oil was not a food additive because the company did not claim the oil
was a food additive. Id. at 74. See also American Health Products Co. v. Hayes, 574 F.
Supp. 1498, 1505 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 744 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1984) (The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York, in determining whether starchblock-
ers was a food, drew on the language of Harris. The court looked at the phrase "intent to
affect the structure or function of the human body" and determined that under Harris, to
determine intent, one must look at specific marketing representations of the manufac-
turer.). See also E.R. Squibb & Sons v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the statutory defini-
tion of a drug as it pertained to the product Mysteclin. Id. at 682. The court used the
language of Harris to reiterate that Congress intended to limit the definition of intent to
items that "purport literally to change the physical structure of the body." Id. at 683.
162. See also O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 231 (stating that both the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey in United States v. 46 Carton... Fairfax Cigarettes and
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Action on
Smoking v. Harris, support the holding that without a specific health claim by the manufac-
turer, cigarette promotion for normal smoking use does not qualify cigarettes as a drug).
163. United States v. 22 Rectangular or Cylindrical Finished Devices, More Or Less,
.... 714 F. Supp. 1159, 1165 (C.D. Utah 1989).
164. Id. at 1159.
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FDCA. 165 Analogous to the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit in Harris, the district court held that objective
intent is shown by product labeling, advertising, or written statements re-
lating to the product's distribution and the product's use.
16 6
Therefore, the test is clear. No matter what product is deemed a device
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, the vendor's intent de-
termines whether the item falls within the jurisdiction of the Act.
The courts have used the "intended use" test to reject the classification
of other products as devices.' 67 In United States v. An Article of Drug...
Ova 11,168 the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
found that a home pregnancy test was neither a drug nor a device because
pregnancy is not a disease and the kits were not intended for use in affect-
ing the woman's body.'6 9 Ova II is especially relevant to FDA jurisdic-
tion over cigarettes in that Congress and the FDA wanted to regulate
home pregnancy tests, but could not do so under the FDCA. Congress
overruled the Ova II case by passing the Medical Device Amendments of
1976 which amended the definition of device to include products such as
the Ova 11.170
B. Agency Regulations
The FDA has codified it's interpretation of "intended use" in a similar
manner as the courts. The agency has stated that "[t]he words 'intended
use' . . . refer to the objective intent of the persons legally responsible for
the labeling of devices.' 71 The regulations further state that the objec-
tive intent can "be shown by labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral
or written statements by such persons or their representatives.' ' 172 The
agency, however, added that intent can be shown by circumstances where
persons legally responsible for the product have knowledge that the prod-
uct is "used for a purpose for which it is neither labeled nor adver-
tised.' 73 This showing of intent has not' been tested in the courts.
165. Id. at 1161.
166. Id at 1165.
167. See Gamerman, supra note 19, at 821. "FDA success with its regulatory strategy of
expansion ended in 1975, when it argued that a home pregnancy test kit was either a drug
or a device and failed at both." Id.
168. 414 F. Supp. 660 (D.N.J. 1975), affd, 535 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1976).
169. Id. at 664-65.
170. See Gamerman, supra note 19, at 857 n.233.
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Having addressed the legislative history of the FDCA, relevant case
law, and agency regulations limiting the definition of a device based on
the intent of manufacturers, the next issue is whether cigarettes meet this
burden.
V. CIGARETrES IN LIGHT OF THE "INTENDED USE" TEST
A. FDA's Jurisdiction Analysis
In promulgating its proposed regulation of cigarettes, the FDA took
the unprecedented step of preparing and publishing a legal analysis of its
position.174 The FDA analysis states that the definitions of "drug" and
"device" are parallel and that the agency has jurisdiction over cigarettes if
they are intended to treat a disease or to affect the structure or any func-
tion of the human body.'75 The FDA further stated that it was asserting
jurisdiction over cigarettes because cigarette "manufacturers intend to
market and distribute products that affect the structure or function of the
[human] body within the meaning of the [FDCA].'
176
The FDA contends that the language of the FDCA supports an objec-
tive intent standard that includes statements showing the vendor's actual
purpose in marketing the product or refuting their claims concerning in-
tended use. 77 However, in its analysis, the FDA takes the objective in-
tent test to a new level which has not yet been addressed by the courts.
The FDA asserts that a seller's awareness of how a product is actually
used and affects the structure or function of the body is enough to meet
the intent test, regardless of how the product is labeled or advertised.
178
Notably, the FDA's interpretation is based on regulatory policy decisions,
not court decisions.' 79 The agency's own administrative decisions that
are unchallenged in the courts are not sufficient to show that these regu-
174. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,462.
175. Id. at 41,463.
176. Id. at 41,464.
177. Id. at 41,473.
The language of the FDCA supports an objective standard that allows considera-
tion of information about the foreseeable uses of the product for pharmacological
purposes, as well as any statements or actions by the vendor that might show the
vendor's actual purpose in marketing a product, or refute the vendor's claims
regarding the product's intended use.
Id.
178. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,474.
179. Id. at 41,475 (citing a rule on vaginal products for over-the-counter use, the FDA
said that the mere presence of a pharmacologically active ingredient could make a product
a drug even in the absence of explicit claims).
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lations are within the FDA's authority."' s
The FDA goes on to state that although a cigarette manufacturer's
stated purpose may be to provide taste or smoking pleasure, under the
objective standard, intent may be shown by the foreseeable consequences
of consumers' use of cigarettes.18' The FDA claims that consumer use is
demonstrated by research conducted since the 1980's, which shows that
nicotine is addictive and dependance-producing.' 8 2
The FDA also used segments of case law that seemingly supported its
argument, but a review of the entire case reveals a lack of support. For
example, the FDA analysis cites Action On Smoking and Health [ASH] v.
Harris83 which notes that "the near-exclusivity of consumer use of ciga-
rettes with the intent 'to affect the structure or function of the body of
man,' would be sufficient by itself to establish that cigarettes are drugs
within the meaning of the FDCA.'184 The precise language used by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however,
states "ASH did not establish, and arguably cannot establish, the near-
exclusivity of consumer use of cigarettes with the intent 'to affect the
structure or any function of the body of man.""' 8 5 Thus, the court de-
cided that none of the consumer use evidence concerning cigarettes
would meet the intent test.
Another assertion made by the agency is that consumers use cigarettes
to obtain the pharmacological effects of nicotine.'86 The FDA cites stud-
ies that show a large portion of consumers use cigarettes for relaxation,
weight control, or reduction of negative feelings.' 87 These uses are not
180. 21 U.S.C. § 371(f)(1) (1994) (providing for an appeal of an FDA order to the
United States court of appeals for the circuit in which the petitioner lives).
181. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,483.
182. Id.
183. 655 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
184. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,480.
185. Harris, 655 F.2d at 240.
186. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,490.
187. Id. See also Marilyn Chase, Fear of Weight Gain Is Preventing Smokers From Quit-
ting Habit, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1996, at B1.
Although 32 million of the estimated 46 million American smokers reportedly
want to quit, only 2% to 3% successfully kick the habit each year. At the same
time, more females are taking up smoking, and are projected to outnumber male
smokers by the year 2000. Why this backslide, even after lung cancer has topped
breast cancer as a killer of women?
The answer in part is that women are dying for a smaller dress size. The five-
pound to 10-pound weight gain that accompanies quitting is seen by some as too
high a price to pay in our fat-phobic culture.
From the earliest cigarette advertising ("Reach for a Lucky instead of a sweet")
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suggested by the manufacturer, however, and therefore do not meet the
true test needed to assert jurisdiction.188
A third argument made by the FDA is that tobacco manufacturers
know that nicotine is addictive and that consumers use the product for
the addictive effect.18 9 The FDA obtained research from the tobacco
companies showing that industry researchers and executives had knowl-
edge that cigarettes act as a drug and that consumers use cigarettes to
obtain the addicting affect of nicotine. 19° The FDA has also found that
"tobacco manufacturers have conducted numerous studies to identify the
dose of nicotine that will elicit the pharmacological effects sought by the
products' users."191 Essentially, the FDA claims that cigarettes are de-
vices because:
[t]he primary purpose of parts of the cigarette, each of which is a
device or device component within the Act's meaning, and the
cigarette itself, a consciously engineered instrument, is to effec-
tuate the delivery of a carefully controlled amount of the nico-
tine to a site in the human body where it can be absorbed. 9'
Even though the FDA purported in the proposed rule to have jurisdic-
tion based on the arguments mentioned above, the FDA realized that its
analysis was vulnerable. If the manufacturer did not objectively state
their intent on cigarette packages or in advertising, the FDA knew it was
on shaky ground in asserting that general awareness and foreseeable con-
sumer use were enough for jurisdiction. The final FDA rule added a new
requirement, not contained in the proposed rule, that cigarette and
smokeless tobacco packages state, "Nicotine-Delivery Device for Persons
18 or Older." 193 This is the ultimate in hypocrisy-the FDA says they
have jurisdiction regardless of what advertising and packaging materials
say; but, just in case that does not work, it will impute intent upon the
manufacturer, distributor and retailer by requiring the product state it is a
nicotine-delivery device.
to today's slinky magazine ads for Virginia Slims and Capri Superslims, tobacco
companies seem to have long exploited the link with thinness. While the appeal is
targeted primarily to women, men also fear softening their hard bodies.
"Using cigarettes is like using an anorectic [appetite suppressing] drug," says
Janet Gross, a psychologist at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine.
Id.
188. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,576 n.145.
189. Id. at 41,491.
190. Id. at 41,499.
191. Id. at 41,504.
192. Id. at 41,522.
193. Final Rule, supra note 2, at 44,617, section 897.25.
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B. FDA's Position Versus Legislative History and the Courts
According to the courts, the first step in testing whether an item is a
device is to look at the plain meaning of the statute. 94 If the statute is
not determinative, then the court turns to legislative history and case law
precedent. 195 Applying this test, the courts cannot find that cigarettes are
devices regardless of the evidence of health risk presented by the FDA.
The FDA statute is clear: an item is not considered to be a device
unless the device is "intended to affect the structure or any function of
the body of man or other animals."' 96 As Judge Kaufman of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York stated, how-
ever, "[s]urely the legislators did not mean [this phrase] to be all-inclusive
as a literal interpretation of this clause would compel us to be."'9 7 For if
this were the case, then the FDA could regulate "well nigh everything in
creation."' 98 Thus, the issue is what Congress meant by the terminology
of "intended to affect."
In examining the legislative history of the FDCA, Congress clearly de-
fined intent to mean the intent of the manufacturer in its representation
of the product."9 Congress also specifically delineated the type of prod-
ucts it had in mind when it developed the device definition. For example,
Congress envisioned quack products such as medical scales that provide
disease diagnosis to be included in the definition of device and subject to
FDA regulation.2 0
Indeed, Congress itself recognized the limitations of the FDCA per-
taining to cigarettes. There was no attempt to impose cigarette labeling
and advertising through the FDCA21 because Congress recognized that
separate legislation was necessary to promulgate labeling and advertising
194. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 1415.
We need not stop to parse the language of the Act's definition of drug, for the
District Court found, and the parties do not disagree here that a literal reading of
the words "intended for use in the ... cure, mitigation, [or] treatment" of disease
"clearly has application" to the Bacto-Unidisk.... Thus, the essential question
for our determination is whether Congress intended the definition of drug to have
the broad coverage the courts below and the parties agree its words allow.
Id
195. Id.
196. 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3) (1994).
197. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 180 F. Supp. at 576.
198. See Gamerman, supra note 19, at 812 n.59 (quoting Representative Collus).
199. Supra note 99.
200. See Gammerman, supra note 19, at 819.
201. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
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standards for cigarette packages.2 °2 Prior FDA Commissioners and FDA
rulings have stated that cigarettes are not within the purview of the
FDCA and that any attempt to regulate cigarettes under the FDCA
would violate legislative intent.2 3 Finally, in 1994, legislation was intro-
duced to bring cigarettes within the FDCA, but the measure failed.20 4
Moreover, the weight of judicial opinion has determined that cigarettes
do not fall within the FDCA device jurisdiction absent representations of
a claim from the vendor or manufacturer that it affects the structure or
function of the human body. In the four cases 20 5 previously discussed
concerning cigarette regulation, the courts did not find that cigarettes
were a drug or device: (1) absent a showing that the manufacturer in-
tended to affect the structure or function of the human body; or, (2) with-
out evidence of the near-exclusivity of consumer use of cigarettes from
which manufacturer or vendor intent can be inferred.20 6 It is obvious that
cigarette companies today no longer claim that their products do any-
thing more than provide taste or smoking pleasure,20 7 and the test to
show near-exclusive consumer use as intended by the manufacturer is al-
most impossible to establish.208
The only issue that has changed within the FDA from the time of the
FDCA's enactment to today is that more studies have been conducted
regarding the health risks of smoking.20 9 Although these new studies
may make cigarette regulation morally compelling or even "politically
correct," they do not meet the intent test for a device under the FDCA.
As stated by one former FDA Commissioner, FDA jurisdiction over ciga-
rettes cannot be predicated solely upon evidence of a serious health
hazard.210
202. Id.
203. See supra notes 103-4 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
205. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 108 F. Supp. 573
(S.D.N.Y. 1952); 46 Cartons, More or Less, Containing Fairfax Cigarettes, 113 F. Supp. 336
(D.N.J. 1953); 354 Bulk Cartons ... Trim Reducing-Aid Cigarettes, 178 F. Supp. 847
(D.N.J. 1959); An Article of Drug... Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784 (1969).
206. See supra notes 118-60 and accompanying text.
207. Proposed Rule, supra note 2, at 41,483.
208. Harris, 655 F.2d at 240.
209. See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text.
210. Harris, 655 F.2d at 239 (quoting statement of Mr. Donald Kennedy, former Com-
missioner of the FDA).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the goal of regulating cigarette availability to three million
adolescent smokers and the three thousand that begin each day is noble,
the current law does not provide a mechanism for that type of regulation.
Since the promulgation of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, Congress
has constantly amended FDA regulations to deal with challenges that
were not previously covered within the FDCA jurisdiction. Actions that
took on a national character, such as the elixir tragedy, the Dalkon Shield
scare, and the Bjork-Shiley scandal were all difficult for the public to ac-
cept, but regulation under the statutes in effect at the time of these inci-
dents was insufficient to bring these products within the FDCA.
Congress responded by promulgating new regulations.
Restriction of cigarette sales falls into the same historical category.
Although regulation of cigarettes to those under eighteen years old is
important, the current law does not provide the FDA with the jurisdiction
to regulate these products. Review of legislative history, case law, and
prior FDA statements clearly shows that cigarettes were not meant to be
covered by the FDCA. Case law and legislative history show that the
determination of FDA jurisdiction over devices turns on vendor or manu-
facturer intent.
Vendors and manufacturers of cigarettes have not demonstrated the
intent required to place cigarettes within the jurisdiction of the FDA. In
fact, they have not made any claims about cigarettes beyond saying that
they provide taste or smoking pleasure. Although this may constitute a
clever evasion of existing FDA jurisdiction on the part of the tobacco
industry, the fact remains that such limited claims by the vendors and
manufacturers are simply not sufficient to meet the FDCA jurisdictional
requirements. If the reduction in cigarette smoking by adolescents and
children is truly a national priority, then Congress must act to pass new
legislation or amend the current FDCA.
Margaret A. Boyd, CPA
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